Showing 1 - 10 of 12
The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010789962
This paper analyzes a sequential voting mechanism that eliminates at each round one candidate, until only one of them is left (the winner). The candidates are the voters and they only differ across their skill level. The payoff allocated to the winner depends on the sequence of elimination of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010789968
When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650702
In this paper we analyze the fairness of the 2007 reform proposal concerning the apportionment of the seats between the regions for the Italian Senate. Theory of power indices is used to compare the actual case with the proposed one. Two scenarios are proposed, senators belonging to the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650703
In this paper, we compare five well-known methods of apportionment, the ones by Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster and Jefferson. The criteria used for this comparison is the minimization of a distance between a power vector and a population vector. The power is measured with the well-known Banzhaf...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009193291
The purpose of this paper is to present a structural specification of the Shapley- Shubik and Banzhaf power indices in a weighted voting rule. We compare them in term of the cardinality of the sets of power vectors (PV). This is done in different situations where the quota or the number of seats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009193292
How can we count and list all the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik index of power configurations for a given number of players? There is no formula in the literature that may give the cardinal of such a set, and moreover, even if this formula had existed, there is no formula which gives the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005523778
Since the political collapse of the 90’s, and in particular since the bicameral commission experience of 1997, Italian governments have always tried to face the need for wide constitutional reform. Reductions in the number of deputies and senators have been planned on several occasions. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005341616
The spatial analysis of power indices is commonly used in the literature to study the importance of ideological criteria. Our purpose is to show, through the example of some french groupings of local cities, the importance of the geographical situation of the players when considering power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328205
In this paper, we compare the five more famous methods of apportionment, the methods of Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster and Jefferson. The criteria used for this comparison is the minimization of a distance between a power vector and a population vector. The power is measured with the well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328207