Showing 1 - 10 of 17
laboratory experiment I examine how confessions work. I analyze whether the willingness to punish harmful failures depends on how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740239
experiment in which a committee decides sequentially on three independent bills. Selfish committee members would turn down all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740240
experiment four subsidiaries of the same parent operate in the same market. Parents earn a specific share of the joint profit and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740242
Do people blame or praise others for producing negative or positive externalities? The experimental philosopher Knobe conducted a questionnaire study that revealed that people blame others for foreseen negative externalities but do not praise them for foreseen positive ones. We find that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462974
This paper tests two basic assumptions underlying court made or statutory provisions prohibiting predatory pricing. Such prohibitions are usually based on the economic grounds that monopolistic pricing is likely to occur in the long run, causing harm to competition and consumers. The first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462975
laboratory experiment we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and when their intentions cannot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462976
paper discusses the results from an experiment in which a mediator can induce two conflict parties to behave cooperatively …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462979
strategically block comprehensive reforms. We analyze in a laboratory experiment whether trust and reciprocity among legislators …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462983
laboratory experiment we test whether lying aversion can explain this behavior by comparing honest and fake apologies. First, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635289
In Geng, Weiss, and Wolff(2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635290