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Agenda Setting and Reciprocal Vote Trading

Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2010

We study the implications of reciprocity on agenda setting in a sequential policy decision. We designed a laboratory … bills but reciprocity allows for implicit vote trading. This mechanism gives power to agenda setters. We find that agenda …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740240

On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2012

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the …. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. We discuss ways …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587853

On the Nature of Reciprocity: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure

Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2011

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in- complete in a systematic way using a new variant of … the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our ndings. The treatment e ect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131631

Doing well by doing good - or doing better by delegating?

Eisenkopf, Gerald; Fischbacher, Urs - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2011

Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the value of the transfers of the investor and the delegate, we find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838448

Horizontal and Vertical Social Preferences in Tournaments

Eisenkopf, Gerald; Teyssier, Sabrina - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2009

tournaments. Moreover, we observe that collusion between the agents and reciprocity towards the principal are mutually exclusive. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008462977