We study the implications of reciprocity on agenda setting in a sequential policy decision. We designed a laboratory … experiment in which a committee decides sequentially on three independent bills. Selfish committee members would turn down all … bills but reciprocity allows for implicit vote trading. This mechanism gives power to agenda setters. We find that agenda …

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the …. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. We discuss ways …

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in- complete in a systematic way using a new variant of … the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our ndings. The treatment e ect …

Machiavelli advises against delegating the distribution of favors. We test this claim in an experiment, in which an …

context. We investigate the impact of social preferences in a tournament using data from a laboratory experiment with two … tournaments. Moreover, we observe that collusion between the agents and reciprocity towards the principal are mutually exclusive. …

In many cases individuals benefit differently from the provision of a public good. We study in a laboratory experiment …

Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called 'point of no return …