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Bruttel, Lisa; Friehe, Tim - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2011

This paper presents experimental evidence that contributions to a public good can be path-dependent for a limited time span. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities. Our data shows that subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225723

Incentive Effects of Funding Contracts: An Experiment

Reiss, J. Philipp; Wolff, Irenaeus - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2011

experiment with four types of contracts (standard debt contract, outside equity, non-monotonic contract, full-subsidy contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325864

Size matters - when it comes to lies

Eisenkopf, Gerald; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Utikal, Verena - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2011

’ truth telling is absolute or depends on the size of a lie. In a laboratory experiment we compare punishment for different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644468

Disadvantageous lies in individual decisions

Fischbacher, Urs; Utikal, Verena - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2011

We present experimental evidence on the existence of disadvantageous lies. Literature so far assumes that people do not lie to their monetary disadvantage. However, some people have preferences for appearing honest. If the utility gained from appearing honest outweighs the monetary payoff gained...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359469

Taking the initiative. What characterizes leaders?

Bruttel, Lisa; Fischbacher, Urs - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2010

decision to lead. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740238

A fault confessed is half redressed - Confessions and Punishment

Utikal, Verena - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2010

laboratory experiment I examine how confessions work. I analyze whether the willingness to punish harmful failures depends on how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740239

Agenda Setting and Reciprocal Vote Trading

Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2010

We study the implications of reciprocity on agenda setting in a sequential policy decision. We designed a laboratory … experiment in which a committee decides sequentially on three independent bills. Selfish committee members would turn down all … setters use their power when setting the agenda but are rather generous in the voting decision. Legislators benefiting from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740240

On the path-dependence of tax compliance

Bruttel, Lisa; Friehe, Tim - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2010

This paper presents experimental evidence that tax compliance is path dependent. We show that individuals faced with the same current tax enforcement parameters, will nevertheless choose different compliance if they have faced different tax enforcement parameters in the past. This finding has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740241

Competition within firms

Bruttel, Lisa; Schudy, Simeon - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2010

experiment four subsidiaries of the same parent operate in the same market. Parents earn a specific share of the joint profit and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740242

Cooperation norms in multiple-stage punishment

Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus - Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut an der Universität Konstanz - 2010

We analyze the interplay between cooperation norms and people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game with multiple punishment stages. By combining multiple punishment stages with self- contained episodes of interaction, we are able to disentangle the e ects of retaliation and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542686