characterised by a social-dilemma situation. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this finding but questions the cooperation … can play in the evolution of cooperation under these conditions. We show a punishing strategy can pave the way for a … the cooperation level in this equilibrium by prompting reluctant cooperators to cooperate. How- ever, when rare mutations …

characterised by a social-dilemma situation. Experimental evidence closely corresponds to this nding but questions the cooperation … can play in the evolution of cooperation under these conditions. We show a punishing strategy can pave the way for a … cooperation level in this equilibrium by prompting reluctant cooperators to cooperate. However, when rare mutations occur, it …

-Theorem-like voluntary cooperation. We ask whether monitoring and indirect punishment with the help of others are comparable to direct … monitoring and punishment in establishing and maintaining voluntary cooperation. The treatment effects we find are rather weak …

. Communication between the mediator and the conflict parties increases cooperation, even if punishment is impossible. However, when … cooperation fails, communication without punishment leads to particularly low payouts for the ‘losing’ party. … paper discusses the results from an experiment in which a mediator can induce two conflict parties to behave cooperatively …

behaviour in a public-good experiment well? And if not, where does the observed behaviour diverge from the prediction? This … equilibrium prediction that is based on the elicited conditional-cooperation preferences. Moreover, more often than not, beliefs …

In many cases individuals benefit differently from the provision of a public good. We study in a laboratory experiment …

Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called 'point of no return …

experiment with four types of contracts (standard debt contract, outside equity, non-monotonic contract, full-subsidy contract …