Showing 1 - 10 of 37
Participants in a public goods experiment receive private or common signals regarding the so-called 'point of no return …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391917
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punishment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the degree of first-mover unkindness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010587853
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in- complete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punish- ment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the de- gree of rst-mover unkindness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131631
This paper presents experimental evidence that contributions to a public good can be path-dependent for a limited time span. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities. Our data shows that subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225723
experiment with four types of contracts (standard debt contract, outside equity, non-monotonic contract, full-subsidy contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325864
’ truth telling is absolute or depends on the size of a lie. In a laboratory experiment we compare punishment for different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644468
We present experimental evidence on the existence of disadvantageous lies. Literature so far assumes that people do not lie to their monetary disadvantage. However, some people have preferences for appearing honest. If the utility gained from appearing honest outweighs the monetary payoff gained...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359469
decision to lead. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740238
laboratory experiment I examine how confessions work. I analyze whether the willingness to punish harmful failures depends on how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740239
We study the implications of reciprocity on agenda setting in a sequential policy decision. We designed a laboratory … experiment in which a committee decides sequentially on three independent bills. Selfish committee members would turn down all … setters use their power when setting the agenda but are rather generous in the voting decision. Legislators benefiting from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008740240