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Organization, Evolution, Cognition and Dynamic Capabilities

Nooteboom, B. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007

Using insights from ‘embodied cognition’ and a resulting ‘cognitive theory of the firm’, I aim to contribute to the … further development of evolutionary theory of organizations, in the specification of organizations as ‘interactors’ that carry … capabilities’ can be fitted into evolutionary theory. I propose that the prime purpose of an organization is to serve as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091884

Link formation in cooperative situations

Dutta, B.; van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091161

Core implementation in modified strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria

Borm, Peter; Otten, G.J.M.; Peters, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091368

On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

Bhaskar, V. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091518

Game theory : The next stage

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

This paper surveys some recent developments in (non-cooperative) game theory and provides an outlook on the near future … of that theory. In particular, attention is focused on the limitations inherent in normative game theory and on attempts … to construct a behavioral version of the theory that incorporates aspects of procedural and bounded rationality. It is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092171

A perfectness concept for multicriteria games

Borm, Peter; van Megen, F.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995

This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092242

Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?

Bester, H.; Güth, W. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1994

We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of players with different preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selfish attitudes. The outcome...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092487

The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games

Arin, J.; Feltkamp, V. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090280

Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games

van Damme, Eric; Carlsson, H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090297

Refinements of Nash equilibrium

van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090301

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