In this paper we introduce three-valued simple games as a natural extension<br/>of simple games. While simple games are used to evaluate single voting systems, three-valued simple games offer the opportunity for a simultaneous analysis of two different voting systems within the same parliamentary...

A cooperative game with non-transferable utility (NTU-game) consists of a collection of payoffsets for the subsets of a nite set of players, for which it has to be determined how much payof each player must receive. The core of an NTU-game consists of all payoffvectors that are in the payoff set...

The Shapley value for directed graph (digraph) games, TU games with limited cooperation introduced by an arbitrary digraph prescribing the dominance relation among the players, is introduced. It is defined as the average of marginal contribution vectors corresponding to all permutations that do...

Abstract: This paper introduces a new solution concept for cooperative games with general coalitional structure in which only certain sets of players, including the set of all players, are able to form feasible coalitions. The solution concept takes into account the marginal contribution of...

In this paper we introduce the concept of quasi-building set that may underlie the coalitional structure of a cooperative game with restricted communication between the players. Each feasible coalition, including the set of all players, contains a nonempty subset called the choice set of the...

Herings et al. (2008) proposed a solution concept called the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. We provide a characterization of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games. The characteration underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of agents,...

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games.We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer.The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer.The Shapley, consensus and...

Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this...

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU- games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payos change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by...

In this paper we define a new family of solutions for the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the set of players exhibits a structure of a priori unions.This family is deeply connected with the Shapley value for games with transferable utility but, moreover, we assume...