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The aim of the present study is to construct a state feedback controller for a given linear system that minimizes the worst-case effect of an L2 -bounded disturbance. Our setting is different from the usual framework of H -theory in that we consider nonzero initial conditions. The situation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090697
Abstract: Proper equilbrium plays an importent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091574
strategy choices. Three main refinements of rationalizability have been proposed in the literature: cautious, perfect, and … proper rationalizability. Nevertheless, some of these refinements also fail to eliminate unreasonable outcomes and suffer … than trembling-hand rationalizability. The other relationships between the various refinements are illustrated by means of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091444
Abstract: We report results from three well-known experimental paradigms, where we use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090374
Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin (1993) develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His model, however, does not fare well when applied to situations with an interesting dynamic structure (like many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090465
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090744
In this paper, we examine the question of which coalition structures farsighted players form in coalition formation games with externalities. We introduce a stability concept for a coalition structure called a sequentially stable coalition structure. Our concept of domination between two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090777
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation.The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091453
The class of maximin actions in general decision problems is characterized.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091469