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On the Structure of the Set of Correlated Equilibria in Two-by-Two Bimatrix Games
Peeters, R.J.A.P.; Potters, J.A.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999
The paper studies the structure of the set of correlated equilibria for 2x2-bimatrix games. We find that the extreme points of the (convex) set of correlated equilibria can be determined very easily from the Nash equilibria of the game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091559
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Non-cooperative games
van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2014
We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution<br/>concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the<br/>question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core.<br/>We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011144456
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Collusion in Experimental Bertrand Duopolies with Convex Costs : The Role of Information and Cost Asymmetry
Argenton, Cédric; Müller, Wieland - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2009
We report the results of a series of experimental Bertrand duopolies where firms have convex costs. Theoretically these duopolies are characterized by a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Using a 2x2 design, we analyze price choices in symmetric and asymmetric markets under 2 information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091104
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Hiding an Inconvenient Truth : Lies and Vagueness (Revision of DP 2008-107)
van Damme, Eric; Potters, Jan; Serra Garcia, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010
When truth conflicts with efficiency, can verbal communication destroy efficiency? Or are lies or vagueness used to … prisoners’ dilemma. Without verbal communication, efficiency is achieved, with contributions for high or intermediate values … efficiency by exaggerating. When communication can be vague, the leader turns to vague messages when the value is intermediate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091313
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The Open-Loop Linear Quadratic Differential Game for Index One Descriptor Systems
Engwerda, Jacob; Salmah, Y. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008
In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090313
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On Properness and Protectiveness in Two Person Multicriteria Games
Quant, Marieke; Borm, Peter; Fiestras-Janeiro, G.; van … - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004
This paper extends the concepts of proper equilibria, protective behaviour and prudent behaviour to multicriteria games.Three types of proper equilibria based on different types of domination are introduced.It is shown that protective behaviour coincides with prudent behaviour.Possible relations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090365
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Learning Strategic Sophistication
Blume, A.; DeJong, D.V.; Maier, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005
We experimentally investigate coordination games in which cognition plays an important role, i.e. where outcomes are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090397
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Taxation and Market Power
Müller, Wieland; Konrad, K.A.; Morath, F. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010
We analyze the incidence and welfare e¤ects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We nd, in line with economic theory, that rms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090400
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Employment Duration and Resistance to Wage Reductions : Experimental Evidence
Burda, M.; Güth, W.; Kirchsteiger, G.; Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998
One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don't employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090402
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Economc Ties and Social Dilemmas : An Experimental Study
van Soest, Daan; Vyrastekova, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090427