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boone, jan; Bijlsma, M.; Zwart, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012

Abstract: The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks’ remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank’s top...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091254

Bank Competition and Stability : Cross-country Heterogeneity (Revised version of CentER DP 2011-080)

Beck, Thorsten; De Jonghe, Olivier; Schepens, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012

Abstract: This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090475

The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline

Ioannidou, Vasso; de Dreu, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006

This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that resembles a natural experiment.We improve upon previous studies by exploiting a unique combination of country-specific circumstances, design features, and data availability that allows us to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091945

Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring : Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Cerqueiro, G.M.; Ongena, S.; Roszbach, K. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011

Collateral is one of the most important features of a debt contract. A substantial theoretical literature motivates the … use of collateral as a means to alleviate ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and … the incidence of credit rationing. Through its seniority effect, collateral may also affect banks’ incentives to monitor …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090503

Reexamining the Empirical Relation between Loan Risk and Collateral : The Role of the Economic Characteristics of Collateral

Ioannidou, Vasso; Berger, A.N.; Frame, W.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012

empirical relation between collateral and loan risk. We posit that certain economic characteristics of collateral may be … associated with the empirical dominance of different risk-collateral channels implied by economic theory, namely the “lender … predictions regarding the empirical relations between collateral and loan risk. For our sample of commercial loans, we find that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090718

Tests of Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral Using Private and Public Information

Ioannidou, Vasso; Berger, A.N.; Frame, W.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010

Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical … literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems … ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092269

Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty : Walsh-Svensson Non-Equivalence Revisited

Eijffinger, Sylvester; Schaling, E.; Hoeberichts, M.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998

We look at the implications of uncertain monetary policy preferences for the targeting and contracting approach to monetary stability. It turns out that in presence of uncertain preferences a linear incentive contract in the sense of Walsh (1995) performs better in terms of social welfare than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090529

Optimal Joint Liability Lending and with Costly Peer Monitoring

Uras, Burak R.; Carli, Francesco - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2014

This paper characterizes an optimal group loan contract with costly peer monitoring. Using a fairly standard moral hazard framework, we show that the optimal group lending contract could exhibit a joint-liability scheme. However, optimality of joint-liability requires the involvement of a group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099372

MBS Ratings and the Mortgage Credit Boom

Ashcraft, A.; Goldsmith-Pinkham, P.; Vickery, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010

We study credit ratings on subprime and Alt-A mortgage-backed securities (MBS) deals issued between 2001 and 2007, the period leading up to the subprime crisis. The fraction of highly-rated securities in each deal is decreasing in mortgage credit risk (measured either ex-ante or ex-post),...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090320

The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation and Specialization

Degryse, Hans; Ongena, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

How do banks react to increased interbank competition?Recent banking theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on bank orientation í L H WKH choice of relationship based versus transactional banking í DQG EDQN LQGXVWU\ specialization.We empirically investigate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090384