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Competition for Traders and Risk
boone, jan; Bijlsma, M.; Zwart, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012
Abstract: The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks’ remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank’s top...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091254
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Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring : Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Cerqueiro, G.M.; Ongena, S.; Roszbach, K. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011
Collateral is one of the most important features of a debt contract. A substantial theoretical literature motivates the … use of collateral as a means to alleviate ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and … the incidence of credit rationing. Through its seniority effect, collateral may also affect banks’ incentives to monitor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090503
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Reexamining the Empirical Relation between Loan Risk and Collateral : The Role of the Economic Characteristics of Collateral
Ioannidou, Vasso; Berger, A.N.; Frame, W.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012
empirical relation between collateral and loan risk. We posit that certain economic characteristics of collateral may be … associated with the empirical dominance of different risk-collateral channels implied by economic theory, namely the “lender … predictions regarding the empirical relations between collateral and loan risk. For our sample of commercial loans, we find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090718
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Tests of Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral Using Private and Public Information
Ioannidou, Vasso; Berger, A.N.; Frame, W.S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010
Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical … literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems … ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092269
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Bank Competition and Stability : Cross-country Heterogeneity (Revised version of CentER DP 2011-080)
Beck, Thorsten; De Jonghe, Olivier; Schepens, G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012
Abstract: This paper documents large cross-country variation in the relationship between bank competition and bank stability and explores market, regulatory and institutional features that can explain this variation. We show that an increase in competition will have a larger impact on banks’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090475
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The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline
Ioannidou, Vasso; de Dreu, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006
This paper studies the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in a framework that resembles a natural experiment.We improve upon previous studies by exploiting a unique combination of country-specific circumstances, design features, and data availability that allows us to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091945
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Incentive Contracts for Central Bankers under Uncertainty : Walsh-Svensson Non-Equivalence Revisited
Eijffinger, Sylvester; Schaling, E.; Hoeberichts, M.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998
We look at the implications of uncertain monetary policy preferences for the targeting and contracting approach to monetary stability. It turns out that in presence of uncertain preferences a linear incentive contract in the sense of Walsh (1995) performs better in terms of social welfare than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090529
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Show me yours and I'll show you mine : Sharing borrower information in a competitive credit market
de Haas, R.T.A.; Bos, J.; Millone, Matteo - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2015
We exploit detailed data on approved and rejected small business loans to assess the impact of the introduction of a credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our findings are threefold. First, mandatory information sharing tightens lending at the extensive margin as more applications are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011273894
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Mobile Money, Trade Credit and Economic Development : Theory and Evidence
Beck, Thorsten; Uras, Burak R.; Pamuk, H.; Ramrattan, R. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2015
Using a novel enterprise survey from Kenya (FinAccess Business), we document a strong positive association between the use of mobile money as a method to pay suppliers and access to trade credit. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs, imperfect credit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245989
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Bank Systemic Risk-Taking and Loan Pricing : Evidence from Syndicated Loans
Gong, D. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2014
In this paper we document evidence of systemic risk taking from syndicated loan<br/>pricing. Using U.S. syndicated loan data, we find that the borrower's idiosyncratic risk is positively priced whereas systematic risk is negatively related to loan spreads, controlling for firm, loan and bank specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011144449