Abstract: We study the effects of improvements in eBay’s rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did...

We study a credit market with adverse selection and moral hazard where sufficient sorting is impossible. The crucial novel feature is the competition between lenders in their choice of contracts offered. Qualities of investment projects are not observable by banks and investment decisions of...

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard<br/>and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on...

This paper constructs a macro-finance model with two types of borrowers: entrepreneurs who engage in productive activities and gamblers who play in lotteries. It links a central bank's interest rate policy to expected cash ows of both types of borrowers. Via this link we study how the...

We consider a tax competition game between asymmetrically un-informed governments. Two governments simultaneously propose tax arrangements to attract a multinational firm (MNF) which has an ex-ante preference to operate in both countries, and governments anticipate that once the MNF accepts...

Some results can be readily applied. For example, overinsurance, i.e. insurance levels above first best as in 'Cadillac' insurance plans, can be rationalized. In a non-linear pricing framework, the model also provides an explanation for marginal prices below marginal costs as observed in flat...

We empirically study how the underlying riskiness of the pool of home equity line of credit originations is affected over the credit cycle. Drawing from the largest existing database of U.S. home equity lines of credit, we use county-level aggregates of these loans to estimate panel regressions...

This paper investigates how initial inequality can causally affect economic growth when moral hazard problems exist in credit markets.Two regimes of the credit markets aiming at overcoming the moral hazard problems are analyzed.The formal one such as bank relies on intermediary between borrowers...

This paper uses longitudinal data to perform tests of asymmetric information in the French automobile insurance market for the 1995-1997 period.This market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experience-rating scheme (bonusmalus).We demonstrate that the result of the test depends...