In this contribution the authors show that development assistance targeting reproductive health overwhelmingly concentrates on HIV/AIDS at the expense of family planning elements. Data on financial contributions disbursed by governments and private foundations are used as collected by the...

The international exchange of tax information, and its merits compared to withholding taxes, is the central topic in current debates in international tax policy.The purpose of this paper is to characterize and compare the tax regimes that emerge with and without information exchange, under the...

The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a-probably "the"-central issue in the formation of international tax policy.Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation-away from parametric tax coordination and...

We examine international fiscal coordination in a world where markets are integrated but national governments are sovereign. Consequences of the liberalization of the capital market on national fiscal policies and possible remedies to resulting ine¢ciencies are analyzed. A simple model, with N...

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD s harmful tax practices project and the EU s savings tax initiative.This paper analyses the...

The aim of this paper is to construct theoretical models which help to shed light on the recent criticisms of volatile investment flows. We do not make any empirical attempt to establish the existence or gauge the importance of the adverse effects of volatile investment flows nor do we make any...

In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and constant unit extraction cost), we fully characterize the set of linear effiency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes. We show that this set is infinite and all the larger as the cost of extraction is low. Depending on the magnitude of the...

We consider a tax competition game between asymmetrically un-informed governments. Two governments simultaneously propose tax arrangements to attract a multinational firm (MNF) which has an ex-ante preference to operate in both countries, and governments anticipate that once the MNF accepts...