We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and...

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of...

This paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact.We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players.This theory of conduct predicts...

In this paper we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple twoperson fishery management game.Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered.Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic frameworkhas no implications for the...

Abstract: In this note we reconsider Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption that every player can stabilize the system on...

In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite and the underlying system affine. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a...

In this note we consider the static output feedback linear quadratic control problem.We present both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this problem has a solution in case the involved cost depend only on the output and control variables.This result is used to present both necessary...

In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium.

In this note we present both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system. A priori no definiteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown...