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Link formation in cooperative situations
Dutta, B.; van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995
In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091161
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Core implementation in modified strong and coalition proof Nash equilibria
Borm, Peter; Otten, G.J.M.; Peters, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091368
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On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
Bhaskar, V. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995
Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091518
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Game theory : The next stage
van Damme, Eric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995
This paper surveys some recent developments in (non-cooperative) game theory and provides an outlook on the near future of that theory. In particular, attention is focused on the limitations inherent in normative game theory and on attempts to construct a behavioral version of the theory that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092171
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A perfectness concept for multicriteria games
Borm, Peter; van Megen, F.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1995
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092242
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Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?
Bester, H.; Güth, W. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1994
We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of players with different preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selfish attitudes. The outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092487
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Values and Governance Systems
Ruys, Pieter H.M.; van den Brink, J.R.; Semenov, R. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999
representation governance, and a budget-allocation function. The common service is provided by a firm, which consists of a value …-production function, an implementation governance, and a remuneration function. They extend the concepts of the consumer and the producer … in neoclassical theory. The functions mentioned are determined by cooperative games. A governance is represented by a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092649
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Learning and Innovation in Inter-Organizational Relationships and Networks
Nooteboom, B. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006
governance side of relationships.Given cognitive distance, organizations need to align cognition sufficiently to enable the fast … cognitive distance. Hence the importance of networks for innovation.On the governance side, the paper gives a review of … density and strength of ties in innovation networks, concerning both competence and governance. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092744
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Competition and Mergers among Nonprofits
Prüfer, Jens - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2007
Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be regulated differently than mergers among for-profit firms? The relevant empirical literature is highly controversial, the theoretical literature is scarce. I analyze the question by modeling duopoly competition with quality-differentiated goods. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090604
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Anti-takeover Provisions as a Source of Innovation and Value Creation
Humphery-Jenner, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011
Managers are risk averse. Excessive risk-aversion can destroy shareholder wealth. A key source of risk is the threat of an opportunistic takeover designed to take advantage of depressed market prices. This is especially the case in innovative or hard-to-value (`HtV') companies whose price may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091215