We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players, for instance a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation.The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game, being the set of payoffs to the...

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue.We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society.We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining...

We measure the contribution of fiscal decentralization to trust in government. Using repeated cross-country survey data of individuals on several measures of trust in govern- ment over the 1994-2007 period, we estimate an ordered response model of the government trust and fiscal decentralization...

Abstract: We report results from three well-known experimental paradigms, where we use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game....

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin (1993) develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His model, however, does not fare well when applied to situations with an interesting dynamic structure (like many...

The aim of the present study is to construct a state feedback controller for a given linear system that minimizes the worst-case effect of an L2 -bounded disturbance. Our setting is different from the usual framework of H -theory in that we consider nonzero initial conditions. The situation is...