In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity.While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson [15],...

In this note we derive the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d.This first order derivative is completely specified in terms of the Pareto frontier function.We show that whenever one player increases his threatpoint always at least one player will...

In order to be able to devise successful strategies for destabilizing terrorist organizations it is vital to recognize and understand their structural properties. This paper deals with the opti- mal communication structure of terrorist organizations when considering the tradeoff between secrecy...

Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society.The framework is general enough to analyse both non-cooperative and cooperative games.We identify a number of shortcomings of existing solution concepts that are used for social...

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don't employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative...

The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms of order p4 for...

Yang s theory of economic specialization under increasing returns to scale (Yang 2001) is a formal development of the fundamental Smith-Young theorem on the extent of the market and the social division of labor.In this theory specialization and, thus, the social division of labor is firmly...

We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices. Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent. Previous...