The paper studies the structure of the set of correlated equilibria for 2x2-bimatrix games. We find that the extreme points of the (convex) set of correlated equilibria can be determined very easily from the Nash equilibria of the game.

We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution<br/>concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the<br/>question ‘how will rational players play?’, and has the Nash equilibrium at its core.<br/>We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as...

In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium.

This paper extends the concepts of proper equilibria, protective behaviour and prudent behaviour to multicriteria games.Three types of proper equilibria based on different types of domination are introduced.It is shown that protective behaviour coincides with prudent behaviour.Possible relations...

We experimentally investigate coordination games in which cognition plays an important role, i.e. where outcomes are affected by the agents level of understanding of the game and the beliefs they form about each others understanding.We ask whether and when repeated exposure permits agents to...

We analyze the incidence and welfare e¤ects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We nd, in line with economic theory, that rms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human...

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don't employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative...

In this note we present both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a linear static state feedback controller if the system is described by an index one descriptor system. A priori no definiteness restrictions are made w.r.t. the quadratic performance criterium. It is shown...

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...