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Is Leverage Effective in Increasing Performance Under Managerial Moral Hazard?

Calcagno, R. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2000

We consider a model in which the principal-agent relation between inside shareholders and the management affects the firm value.We study the effect of financing the project with risky debt in changing the incentive for a risk-neutral shareholder (the principal) to implement the project-value...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091167

Delegation of responsibility in organizations

de Bijl, P.W.J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090447

Regulate or Deregulate : Influencing Network Interconnenction Charges

van de Wielle, B. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

-and-keep. Delegation corresponds to bargaining about the interconnection charges using the regulatory schemes as disagreement outcomes ….Applying regulation benefits the consumers.Under full regulation, access charges account for asymmetries and allow a unique Ramsey price.Delegation … benefits the operators.In a mature market delegation robs the government of any market influence.In a non-mature market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091385

Strategic delegation : An experiment

Fershtman, C.; Gneezy, U. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092164

Inequality, Credit Market Imperfection, Segmentation and Economic Growth

Zhu, D. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2001

This paper investigates how initial inequality can causally affect economic growth when moral hazard problems exist in credit markets.Two regimes of the credit markets aiming at overcoming the moral hazard problems are analyzed.The formal one such as bank relies on intermediary between borrowers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090401

Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Anonymous Markets

Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, C.; Stahl, K. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2013

Abstract: We study the effects of improvements in eBay’s rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090420

Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance : Longitudinal Evidence from France

Dionne, G.; Michaud, P.C.; Dahchour, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004

This paper uses longitudinal data to perform tests of asymmetric information in the French automobile insurance market for the 1995-1997 period.This market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experience-rating scheme (bonusmalus).We demonstrate that the result of the test depends...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090444

Why Does it Matter that Beliefs and Valuations be Correctly Represented?

Grant, S.; Karni, E. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

This paper contains an analysis of a simple principal-agent problem illustrating possible problems that may arise when the prinicpal ascribes to the agent subjective probabilities and utilities that are implied by the subjective expected utility model but do not represent the agent's beliefs and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090676

Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data

Abbring, Jaap H.; Chiappori, P.A.; Zavadil, T. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008

characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives to avoid claims that are generated by the Dutch experience …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090789

What do Information Frictions Do?

Bhattacharya, J.; Chankraborty, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

Numerous researchers have incorporated labor or credit market frictions within simple neoclassical models to (i) facilitate quick departures from the Arrow-Debreu world, thereby opening up the role for institutions, (ii) inject some realism into their models, and (iii) explain cross country...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090906