We experimentally investigate coordination games in which cognition plays an important role, i.e. where outcomes are affected by the agents level of understanding of the game and the beliefs they form about each others understanding.We ask whether and when repeated exposure permits agents to...

The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care...

In common-interest spatial-dispersion games the agents common goal is to choose distinct locations.We experimentally investigate the role of cognition in such games and compare it with the role of cognition in spatial matching games. In our setup cognition matters because agents may be...

It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping ö from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image ö (x)has a nonempty intersection with the normal...

Non-cooperative games are mathematical models of interactive strategic decision situations.In contrast to cooperative models, they build on the assumption that all possibilities for commitment and contract have been incorporated in the rules of the game.This contribution describes the main...

A class of non cooperative games characterized by a `congestion e ect' is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy pro les maximizing the potential function coincide.The structure of the...

In this paper some new approximate fixed point theorems for multifunctions in Banach spaces are presented and a method is developed indicating how to use approximate fixed point theorems in proving the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for non-cooperative games.