We propose a collective labor supply model with household production that generalizes an original model of Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir (2005). In our model, adults' individual preferences do not only depend on own leisure and individual private consumption of market goods. They also depend on...

We present a nonparametric 'revealed preference' methodology for empiri- cally analyzing collective consumption behavior. First, we introduce an integer programming (IP) methodology for testing data consistency with collective con- sumption models that account for publicly as well as privately...

This paper proposes a novel explanation of the vast empirical evidence showing that output and prices react asymmetrically to monetary policy innovations over contractions and expansions in the business cycle. We use VAR techniques to show that monetary policy exerts stronger e¤ects on the U.S....

We develop a revealed preference approach to analyze non-unitary con- sumption models with intrahousehold allocations deviating from the cooper- ative (or Pareto e¢ cient) solution. At a theoretical level, we establish re- vealed preference conditions of household consumption models with...

We apply the collective consumption model of Browning, Chiappori and Lew- bel (2006) to analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly. The model focuses on individual preferences, a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple, and a sharing rule...

Competition authorities and regulatory agencies sometimes impose pricing restrictions on firms with substantial market power — the “dominant” firms. We analyze the welfare effects of a ban on behaviour-based price discrimination in a two-period setting where the market displays a...

Abstract: Sharp nonparametric bounds are derived for Hicksian compensating and equivalent variations. These "i-bounds" generalize earlier results of Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2008). We show that their e-bounds are sharp under the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). They do not...

Abstract: We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor’s pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive...