In a simple model of resource depletion (isoelastic demand and constant unit extraction cost), we fully characterize the set of linear effiency-inducing tax/subsidy schemes. We show that this set is infinite and all the larger as the cost of extraction is low. Depending on the magnitude of the...

Abstract: We summarize and review the literature on two types of economic experiments. First we discuss the use of experimental laboratories to testbed market solutions to issues in environmental policy. We concentrate on experiments with one and two-sided markets, and applications in the domain...

Abstract We analyze a dynamic game between a buyer and a seller of an exhaustible resource. The seller chooses resource supply; the buyer can pay a fixed cost to invent a perfect substitute for the resource at any time. In closed-loop equilibrium, the buyer adopts the substitute when the...

With regard to global or regional environmental problems, do countries that take unilateral actions inspire other countries to curtail emissions?In this paper this possibility is investigated by the use of a novel design of a laboratory public bad experiment with a leader.Twelve groups of five...

In this paper we discuss a real-life case study in the optimization of the logistics network for the collection of containers from end-of-life vehicle dismantlers in the Netherlands.Advanced planning concepts like dynamic assignment of dismantlers to logistic service providers are analyzed by a...

We introduce an accurate, easily implementable, and fast algorithm to compute optimal decisions in discrete-time long-horizon welfaremaximizing problems. The algorithm is useful when interest is only in the decisions up to period T, where T is small. It relies on a flexible parametrization of...

Finding the lexicographic maximum of a polytope in Rn can be achieved by solving a suitable LP-problem.

In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium.