In this paper we present an axiomatic analysis of several ranking methods for tournaments. We find that two of them exhibit a very good behaviour with respect to the set of properties under consideration. One of them is the maximum likelihood ranking, the most common method in statistics and...

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group.The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who are...

Recent work by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) considers the problem of group identification from a social choice perspective.These authors provide an axiomatic characterization of a liberal aggregator whereby the group consist of those and only those individuals each of which views oneself a...

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible.Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize three cardinality-based rules which arise naturally in this dichotomous setting.They are what we call the symmetric...

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value.We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and...

This paper analyzes the relations between social capital, institutions and trust.These concepts are full of ambiguity and confusion.This paper attempts to dissolve some of the confusion, by distinguishing trust and control, and analyzing institutional and relational conditions of trust.It...

We consider a network economy in which economic agents are connected within a structure of value-generating relationships. Agents are assumed to be able to participate in three types of economic activities: autarkic self-provision; binary matching interactions; and multi-person cooperative...

We consider a relational economy in which economic agents participate in three types of relational economic activities: autarkic activities; binary matching activities; and plural cooperative activities. We introduce a stability notion and characterize stable interaction structures, both in the...