We analyse gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design.This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments.We observe that, on averge, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are...

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and...

In this paper, we address the concept of trust by combining (i) the self-reported trust and belief in trustworthiness of others from a general unpaid questionnaire, (ii) choices made in a social valuation task designed to measure subjects' distributional preferences, (iii) strategies submitted...

We study a society of agents where individual incentives conflict with collective ones and thus individual utility maximization leads to inefficient outcomes. We assume that there is no functioning central institution which can control individual behavior. Instead, we analyze a system of what we...

Abstract: Using a dataset for a demographically representative sample of the Dutch population, containing a revealed preference risk attitude measure, as well as very detailed information about participants’ religious background, we study three issues raised in previous literature. First, we...

We study financial contagion in an experimental market. There are two assets and an exogenous shock reduces the value of one of the two assets. Whether and how the other asset is affected depends on the correlation between the underlying values of the two assets. In some trials, the...