different voting systems within the same parliamentary body. This paper analyzes the core and the Shapley value of three …-valued simple games. Using the concept of vital players, the vital core is constructed and we show that the vital core is a subset … of the core. The Shapley value is characterized on the class of all three-valued simple games. The model is applied to …

coalitions we show that every Step out - Step in sequencing game<br/>has a non-empty core. This upper bound is a sufficient … condition for a sequencing<br/>game to have a non-empty core. Moreover, this paper provides a polynomial time<br/>algorithm to …

nite set of players, for which it has to be determined how much payof each player must receive. The core of an NTU … guarantee that the Shapley value, being the average of all marginal vectors of the game, is an element of the core. Convexity of … elements of the core. As solution concept for NTU-games we propose a set of solutions that is determined by the average of all …

convexity type condition is provided that guarantees its stability with respect to an appropriately defined core concept. An …

The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal vectors. In … larginal vector of the set is a core element, then the game is compromise stable. The first characterization of these sets is …

-building set. Properties of this solution are also studied. To establish core stability we introduce appropriate convexity …