This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in apex games under the following assumptions: first, payoff … division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition … can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions).In contrast with the results of other …

total reward.First it is shown that the value of a coalition of an MLTS game is determined by taking the maximum of suitable … combinations of one and two person coalitions.Secondly it is shown that MLTS games with ¯ve or less players have a nonempty core ….However, a six player MLTS game may have an empty core.For the special instance where the reward between a pair of nodes is equal …

.For both classes, following explicit procedures to go from the initial processing order to an optimal order for the coalition … of all players, equal gain splitting rules are defined.It is shown that these rules lead to core elements of the …

finds a core allocation in finitely many rounds. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its …

In this paper, we characterise the compromise value of a game as the barycentre of the edges of its core cover.For this …

solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a postive valued convex game …

approach to efficiently allocating the worth of the `grand coalition' is using share mappings which assign to every game a set … containing the (Shapley) share-core, the Banzhaf share-core and the Large Banzhaf share-core. We provide characterizations of …