In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate

We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the corporate governance structure and the division of profits between human and financial capital. In a democratic society where financial wealth is concentrated, a political majority may prefer to restrain governance by...

This article proposes a theory of corporate transparency and its determinants. We show that under imperfect product market competition, the corporate transparency decision affects the value of equity and debt claims differently. We then embed this insight in a model of endogenous investor...

While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on...

Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labor rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits competition. We model how incumbents lobby harder to block access to finance to entrants when politicians are less accountable to voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and...

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequality and political accountability undermine entry and financial development. In- cumbents seek a low level of effective investor protection to prevent potential entrants from raising capital. They succeed because they can...

This survey reviews the literature on the political economy of financial structure, broadly defined to include the size of capital markets and banking systems as well as the distribution of access to external finance across firms. The theoretical literature on the institutional basis for...

This paper argues that historical political preferences on the role of capital markets

This paper discusses liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities. It focuses on the relative