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Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin G. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within … on the reciprocity of employees. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144512

Hurting hurts more than Helping helps: The Role of the Self-serving Bias

Offerman, Theo - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136955

Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets

Riedl, Arno; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by paying high wages, and workers reciprocate by providing high efforts. Tax LSE is theoretically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795580

Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory

Heijden, Eline C.M. van der; Nelissen, Jan H.M.; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

We examine an experimental gift exchange game in which the players can improve upon the unique no-gifts equilibrium through cooperative gift giving. The main feature of the study is that there are two different types of gift exchange, which we call simple and complex exchange, respectively....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209458

Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators know each other

Reuben, Ernesto; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144451

Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

by reciprocity. A reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm a full return on its investment. We present empirical … evidence that supports the proposed mechanism. Workers with a high sensitivity to reciprocity have 15% higher training rates … than workers with a low sensitivity to reciprocity. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144467

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513238

Gift Exchange and the Separation of Ownership and Control

Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136878

Gift Exchange in the Workplace

Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136961

Control without Deception

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

in a public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more … sensitive to free-riding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that … start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962