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Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting

Veelen, Matthijs van - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and how neutrally stable strategies can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144499

Exploitation and Cooperation in Networks

Galeotti, Andrea; Meléndez, Miguel - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144533

In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting

Veelen, Matthijs van; Garcia, Julian - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally stable strategies there is a stepping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838642

Control without Deception

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

in a public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more … sensitive to free-riding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that … explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.<BR><BR> …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations. Subjects in the partners condition contribute from the first period on significantly more to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974

The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137083

When the Quality of a Nation triggers Emigration

Dalen, Hendrik P. van; Henkens, Kène - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Why do people leave high-income countries with extensive welfare states? This article will examine what underlies the emigration intentions of native-born inhabitants of one industrialized country in particular: the Netherlands. To understand emigration from high-income countries we focus not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137297

Partners contribute more to Public Goods than Strangers: Conditional Cooperation

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 1997

In a series of experiments, we compare a situation where the same group of four subjects plays 25 repetitions of a public good game (partners condition) to a situation where subjects play this game in changing group formations over 25 periods (strangers condition). We observe that, on aggregate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281945

Errors in Judicial Decisions

Sonnemans, Joep; Dijk, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

verdict. In this experiment we examine the relationship between evidence of which the strength is known, subjective …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209452

Investment, Resolution of Risk, and the Role of Affect

Winden, Frans van; Krawczyk, Michal; Hopfensitz, Astrid - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

-based questionnaire before the experiment and participants’ preferences for resolution timing, risk, and time were incentive compatibly … measured during the experiment. Main findings are that delayed resolution can affect investment, that the effect depends on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144438