We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … auctions do not differ in subjects’ propensity to collude overtly and in the likelihood that subjects defect from a collusive …

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of a leniency program against bidding rings in two commonly used auctions …

If a government auctions the right to market a good, continuity is likely to be of significant importance. In a …

class of games, and show how it can be used to directly solve for equilibrium behavior in auctions, pricing games …

There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an … auctioneer. We show that auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where bidders signal their type …

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest … bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two …

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous … Internet auctions. …

lottery ticket. li one license is auctioned, auctions select the firm that is least risk averse. This is what we call the risk …

divestitures. The Dutch government has done exactly that, organizing auctions to redistribute tenancy rights for high- way gasoline …

The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet …