It is widely recognized that the shape of networks influences both individual and aggregate behavior. This raises the … question which types of networks are likely to arise. Our paper fits into the literature that addresses this question. The … groups. In this paper we give a full characterization of the networks induced by a minimal curb set for any number of groups …

This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation with small …, this set contains large- as well as small-diameter networks. For all benefit functions, the periphery-sponsored star is the … most stable. When the marginal benefits of information are constant, all non-star networks are equally stable. With …

robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a society with many groups, where it is cheaper to connect within … groups as compared to across groups, strategic play by individuals leads to a network architecture in which there is a core …

nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …

, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

In this paper we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization of largeness … of the core is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization … shows the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements of the …