Showing 1 - 10 of 72
Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific … training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from … laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in specific training than theory predicts. We propose a simple model in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144467
This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers’ wages rise with seniority (= a worker’s tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137057
studying or in a full-time educational track. The former training is relatively firm-specific whereas the latter training is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504888
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987441
We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016258
Numerous gift exchange experiments have found a positive relationship between employers' wage offers and workers' effort levels. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. Yet in reality many firms are characterized by the separation of ownership and control....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136878
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136961
We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136973
Fringe benefits of various kinds have become an essential element of modern labour market mechanisms. Firms offer transport-related fringe benefits such as transport subsidies (company cars, travel and parking subsidies) and relocation subsidies to job applicants. The spatial implications of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137094
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level. In general, 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137214