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Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition

Vrijburg, Hendrik; Mooij, Ruud A. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model … an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates … are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513231

Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137188

Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Even under antitrust enforcement, firms may still form a cartel in an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model when the discount factor is sufficiently close to one. We present a linear oligopoly model where the profit-maximizing cartel price converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838625

The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing

Houba, Harold; Motchenkova, Evgenia; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531430

Governmental Competition in Road Charging and Capacity Choice

Ubbels, Barry; Verhoef, Erik - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

played between the two actors, but much more whether there is cooperation (leading to first-best) or competition between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136964

The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities

Frijters, Paul; Tieman, Alexander F. - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

In this paper we argue that authorities aid cooperation by means of direct coordination or the enforcement of re …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136860

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

in the final periods. We interpret subjects' behavior in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974

How Universal is Behavior?

Brandts, Jordi; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; Schram, Arthur - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137040

The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137115

The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for Sustaining Co-operation

Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

can increase the cooperation level of individuals in the group. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137197