This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for...

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance...

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

This paper uses a unified treatment of real options and game theory to examine value appropriation in takeovers within a competitive environment of imperfect information. The integrated model considers a potential target as a shared real option on a bundle of resources. Competing potential...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

One of the debates in the capital budgeting model selection is between the free cash flow and DCF methods. In this paper an attempt is made to compare SVA against NPV model based on Monte Carlo simulations. Accordingly, NPV is found less sensitive to value driver variations and has got higher...

We develop an economic theory of “flexibility”, which we interpret as the discretion or ability to make a decision that others disagree with. We show that flexibility is essentially an option for the decisionmaker, and can be valued as such. The value of the flexibility option is decreasing...

The survey findings indicate the existence of gap between theory and practice of capital budgeting. Standard appraisal methods have shown a wider project value discrepancy, which is beyond and above the contingency limit. In addition, the research has found the growing trend in the use of value...

In this paper we introduce flexibility as an economic concept and apply it to the firm’s security issuance decision and capital structure choice. Flexibility is the ability to make decisions that one thinks are best even when others disagree. The firm’s management values flexibility because...