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Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications to Noncooperative Games

Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137165

The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games

Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

We study the impact of advice or observation on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty-contest game. Both sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144513

The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137083

Heterogeneity as a Natural Source of Randomness

Diks, Cees; Weide, Roy van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We propose a new framework for studying the evolution of heterogeneous beliefs in a dynamic feedback setting. Beliefs distributions are defined on a beliefs space representing a continuum of possible strategies agents can choose from. Agents base their choices on past performances, re-evaluating...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136904

Continuous Beliefs Dynamics

Diks, Cees; Weide, Roy van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

We propose a general framework for studying the evolution of heterogeneous beliefs in a dynamic feedback setting. Beliefs distributions are defined on a continuous space representing the possible strategies agents can choose from. Agents base their choices on past performances. As new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137369

Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control

Siemens, Ferdinand von - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009201127

Hurting hurts more than Helping helps: The Role of the Self-serving Bias

Offerman, Theo - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136955

Measuring the Power of Nodes in Digraphs

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

Many economic and social situations can be represented by a digraph. Both axiomatic and iterative methods to determine the strength or power of all the nodes in a digraph have been proposed in the literature. We propose a new method, where the power of a node is determined by both the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136985

The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set … generically consists of a finite number of payoff vectors. Convex TU-games have a non-empty socially stable core, irrespective of … socially stable core by two applications. One application concerns sequencing games and the other one the distribution of water. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137108

Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games

Veelen, Matthijs van - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

games are uncertain. The second is that it allows for strategies that make an evolutionary approach possible, while folk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137329