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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456

Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin G. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144512

Returns to Tenure or Seniority?

Buhai, Sebastian; Portela, Miguel; Teulings, Coen; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers’ wages rise with seniority (= a worker’s tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137057

Auctions, Market Prices and the Risk Attitude Effect

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op- erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket compared to a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argument are differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137048

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639

Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams

Crutzen, Benoît S.Y.; Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

Organization differ in the degree to which they differentiate employees by ability. We analyse how the effect of differentiation on employee morale may explain this variation. By comparing employees using ordinary talk, a manager boosts the self-image of some, but hurts that of others. Whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144567

Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A.J. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450717

Strategic Wage Setting and Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications

Gautier, Pieter A.; Moraga-González, José L. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209482

The Interaction between Explicit and Relational Incentives: An Experiment

Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016258

Worker Reciprocity and Employer Investment in Training

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

Standard economic theory predicts that firms will not invest in general training and will underinvest in specific training. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that firms do invest in general training of their workers. Evidence from laboratory experiments points to less underinvestment in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144467

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