Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...

There are two important reasons for consumers to spend gift certificates differently than gifts in cash or non-gift income: a) they are forced to change their shopping pattern because of the conditions imposed by the issuer of the certificates, or b) they purposely separate gift certificates...

It is conceivable that the "whether to buy" and "how much to buy" decisions in the purchasing process of households are influenced by the inventory process. In this paper we therefore put forward a model for consumption, where we rely on established economic theory. We incorporate this model in...

This paper builds a consumer search model where the cost of going back to stores already searched is explicitly taken into account. We show that the optimal search rule under costly recall is very different from the optimal search rule under perfect recall. Under costly recall, the optimal...

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium proposals in the alternating offers model, also for positive time between proposals. As time vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is...

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...

<I>Abstract</I><p> See document.<p>

Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in 2-player non-zero-sum strategic games, whose Nash equilibria are only mixed.