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Preopening and Equilibrium Selection
Calcagno, Riccardo; Lovo, Stefano - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We introduce a form of pre-play communication that we call "preopening". During the preopening, players announce their tentative actions to be played in the underlying game. Announcements are made using a posting system which is subject to stochastic failures. Posted actions are publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008484068
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Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137155
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Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary … vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209433
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Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is … the Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem and the Maximum Theorem implies convergence to the Nash … bargaining solution when time between proposals vanishes. The model unifies alternating offers, one-sided offers and random …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209487
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Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
bargaining frontier. However, when players have different time preferences, intertemporal trade may lead to continuation payoffs … above the bargaining frontier. We provide a thorough study of this problem without imposing the conventional assumption. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144464
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On Hierarchies and Communication
Brink, René van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137204
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Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646228
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Two-way Flow Networks with Small Decay
Jaegher, K. De; Kamphorst, J.J.A. - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
This paper characterizes the set of equilibrium networks in the two-way flow model of network formation with small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838607
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One-way Flow Networks: the Role of Heterogeneity
Galeotti, Andrea - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are asymmetric and central players may emerge. Second, I show that non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144411
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Exploitation and Cooperation in Networks
Galeotti, Andrea; Meléndez, Miguel - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
that the individual's incentives depend on the architecture of the network as well as on the position of the individual … within the network. In particular, when an efficient interaction requires players to mutually cooperate, efficient social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144533