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Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study

Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513212

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513238

Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987441

Gift Exchange in the Workplace

Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more … convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways … than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136961

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two … each manager tries to sway the employee's effort his way. While this may result in too much social exchange, the attention …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136973

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137227

Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations

Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838534

Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639

Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats

Hu, Audrey; Zhou, Liang - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137008

The Transaction Costs Perspective on Costs And Benefits of Government Regulation

Butter, Frank A.G. den; Graaf, Marc de; Nijsen, André - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

This paper explores the feasibility to extend the Standard Cost Model (SCM) for calculating the costs of government regulation by taking all transaction costs into account which stem from the principal/agent relationship between regulatory authorities and economic entities. From that perspective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504925