This paper analyses the national tax treatment of interest expenditures of multinational enterprises in a non- cooperative world. It is shown that the international tax system generally leads to distortions in the capital decisions of multinational firms. In contrast to the existing literature...

This discussion paper has resulted in ch. 4 of <A href="http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=edksC0nRPZYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=allesintitel:+%22Labor+Market+Institutions+and+Public+Regulation%22&ots=-umxBkjdnT&sig=oeFDTjhnSeo-w-4nuTjTJpuaUr8#v=onepage&q=&f=false">'Labor Market Institutions and Public Regulation'</A>, pp. 123-61, (Jonas Agell, Michael Keen, Alfons Weichenrieder (eds.)), 2004, MIT Press, 228 p.

Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a...

Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to...

A committee makes a decision on a project on behalf of "the public." Members of the committee agree on the a priori value of the project, and hold additional private information about its consequences. They are experts who care about the value of the project and about being considered well...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

A ranking method assigns to every weighted directed graph a (weak) ordering

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

This paper presents a study on the recently proposed linear inequality representation of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions (ASWFs). We first give an alternative proof of the ASWF integer linear inequality representation theorem, and then show several sufficient conditions on preference domains...

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...