Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 97
Cover Image
Reciprocity and Emotions: Arousal, Self-Reports, and Expectations
Ben-Shakhar, Gershon; Bornstein, Gary; Hopfensitz, Astrid; … - Tinbergen Institute - 2004
Although reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this 2-person game, player 1 can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504959
Cover Image
The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games
Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias; Wakolbinger, Florian - Tinbergen Institute - 2007
sources of information trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. Yet, we find that subjects who receive naïve advice …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144513
Cover Image
Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered
Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Kocher, Martin G.; Sutter, Matthias - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
While most papers on team decision-making find teams to behave more selfish, less trusting and less altruistic than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137046
Cover Image
The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation
Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2005
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137083
Cover Image
The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study
Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 1999
The power to take game is a simple two player game where players are randomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder. Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual real effort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100
Cover Image
Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction
Bosman, Ronald; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2003
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137109
Cover Image
The Trust Game behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences
Vyrastekova, Jana; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838587
Cover Image
On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations
Janssen, Maarten C.W. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
This paper argues that the notion of focal points is important in understanding bargaining processes. Recent literature … confines a discussion of the usefulness of the notion to coordination problems and when bargaining experiments result in … equal split division and it re-interprets recent experimental evidence in bargaining games. Experimental economists should …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137014
Cover Image
Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary … vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209433
Cover Image
Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute
The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is … the Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem and the Maximum Theorem implies convergence to the Nash … bargaining solution when time between proposals vanishes. The model unifies alternating offers, one-sided offers and random …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209487