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Baye, Michael R.; Kovenock, Dan; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine "spillover" effects … important economic environments, as well as in classic contests adapted to recent experimental and behavioral models where …, tournaments, R&D races, models of ligitation, and a host of other contests. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964456

Firm Formation with Complementarities: The Role of the Entrepreneur

Roessler, Christian; Koellinger, Philipp - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We model the emergence of organization forms in a game between prospective entrepreneurs. Complementary roles arise endogenously in a way that admits a stable assignment of workers to firms. This contrasts with existing work on job matching, where stability typically requires workers to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016278

Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study

Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513212

Auctions with Flexible Entry Fees

Janssen, Maarten; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Maasland, Emiel - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. This paper argues that these inefficiencies can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513243

Going Once, Going Twice, Reported! Cartel Activity And The Effectiveness Of Leniency Programs in Experimental Auctions

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of a leniency program against bidding rings in two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). Our results show that the leniency program does not affect the average winning bid, nor the average...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008531423

The Unique-lowest Sealed-bid Auction

Houba, Harold; Laan, Dinard van der; Veldhuizen, Dirk - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Unique-lowest sealed-bid auctions are auctions in which participation is endogenous and the winning bid is the lowest bid among all unique bids. Such auctions admit very many Nash equilibria (NEs) in pure and mixed strategies. The two-bidders' auction is similar to the Hawk-Dove game, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136936

Auctions under Payoff Uncertainty: The Case with Heterogeneous Bidder-Aversion to Downside Risk

Hu, Audrey; Zou, Liang - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

This paper characterizes the optimal first-price auction (FPA) and second-price auction (SPA) for selling rights, contracts, or licenses that involve ensuing payoff uncertainty for the winning bidder. The distribution of the random payoff is common knowledge, except that bidders have private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136943

Auctions with Numerous Bidders

Caserta, Silvia; Vries, Casper G. de - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except for a few simple distribution function for the bidders'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136954

The Extent of Internet Auction Markets

Haan, Laurens de; Vries, Casper de; Zhou, Chen - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Internet auctions attract numerous agents, but only a few become active bidders. A major difficulty in the structural analysis of internet auctions is that the number of potential bidders is unknown. Under the independent private value paradigm (IPVP)the valuations of the active bidders form a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136995

Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats

Hu, Audrey; Zhou, Liang - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137008