Which signals are important in gaining attention in science? For a group of 1,371 scientific articles published in 17 demography journals in the years 1990-1992 we track their influence and discern which signals are important in receiving citations. Three types of signals are examined: the...

We demonstrate the possibility of shake-out of firms and emergence of inter-firm heterogeneity along the (socially optimal) dynamic equilibrium path of a competitive industry with free entry and exit, even when there is no uncertainty and all firms are ex ante identical with perfect foresight....

We study two aspects of globalization. It allows a decision-maker to go beyond his own local experience and to learn from other decision-makers in addressing common problems. This improves the identification and diffusion of best practices. It also provides extra information to `markets' that...

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection. Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote on the project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability that good decisions are...

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting...

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents' risk coefficients, ratios of...

Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource...

Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper shows that for all of these neutrally stable strategies there is a stepping...

For games in which there is no evolutionarily stable strategy, it can be useful to look for neutrally stable ones. In extensive form games for instance there is typically no evolutionary stable strategy, while there may very well be a neutrally stable one. Such strategies can however still be...