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The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

) Irritation and contempt drive punishment behavior. (3) There are discontinuous “jumps” in the behavior of responders. They either … choose no punishment (destroy nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroy everything). (4) Expectations have a … significant effect on the probability of punishment but not on the intensity of experienced emotion. We explain this last result …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100

Give or take? Rewards vs. Charges for a Congested Bottleneck

Rouwendal, Jan; Verhoef, Erik T.; Knockaert, Jasper - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838537

Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions

Renes, Sander - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory have shown that they can attract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854554

Decision Making and Learning in a Globalizing World

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

We study two aspects of globalization. It allows a decision-maker to go beyond his own local experience and to learn from other decision-makers in addressing common problems. This improves the identification and diffusion of best practices. It also provides extra information to `markets' that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838554

Positional Power in Hierarchies

Brink, René van den; Steffen, Frank - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organisations. In this paper we consider positional power in hierarchies. One of the problems with the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the bare...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137145

On Socio-economic Roles and Specialization

Gilles, Robert P.; Lazarova, Emiliya; Ruys, Pieter H.M. - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Xiaokai Yang's theory of economic specialization under increasing returns to scale is a formal development of the fundamental Smith-Young theorem on the extent of the market and the social division of labor. In this theory specialization and, thus, the social division of labor is firmly embedded...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137288

Axiomatizations of a Positional Power Score and Measure for Hierarchies

Brink, René van den; Steffen, Frank - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organizations. One of the problems with the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the bare positions of the actors. While such an analysis informs us about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450751

Negative Reciprocity and the Interaction of Emotions and Fairness Norms

Reuben, Ernesto; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after punishment for an unkind action. It also studies how … fairness perceptions affect the reaction to punishment and whether this effect is consistent across repeated play and role …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136864

The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

anger, ‘social’ emotions like shame and guilt need to be present for punishment to be an effective deterrent of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137115

The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for Sustaining Co-operation

Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

them concerns the question of “who punishes”. In the first approach, punishment is executed by the group members themselves … individually, i.e., punishment is decentral in nature. The second approach is based on the idea that individuals may be willing to … delegate the punishment to a central, external authority. The key questions to answered are, whether individuals are willing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137197