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In this paper we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization of largeness … of the core is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization … shows the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009132174
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008646228
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838573
, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136982
-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137089
of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of … stable core is the set of socially stable elements of the core. We show that the socially stable core is non-empty if the … game itself is socially stable. In general the socially stable core consists of a finite number of faces of the core and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137108
vector of ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement of the core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it … lies in the core and the payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection of graphs. We … prove that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core. <BR><BR> We conclude by some examples showing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281869
This paper associates a strategic <I>n</I>-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...</i>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144450
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016260
provide a polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137018