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Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study
Onderstal, Sander; Meerendonk, Arthur Van de - Tinbergen Institute - 2009
In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513212
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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513238
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Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives
Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987441
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace
Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136961
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Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations
Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
the implications of these contract imperfections for optimal organizational design. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136973
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137227
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Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations
Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838534
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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639
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Alternating Offers in Economic Environments
Houba, Harold - Tinbergen Institute
The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209433
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A Behavioral Model for Participation Games with Negative Feedback
Dindo, Pietro; Tuinstra, Jan - Tinbergen Institute - 2006
We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209448