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the size of credible deviations. In our experiment, we find support for the relevance of credible deviations. In addition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838631
We theoretically and experimentally study voter behavior in a setting characterized by plurality rule and mandatory voting, where voters choose from three options. We are interested in the occurrence of strategic voting in an environment where Condorcet cycles may occur. In particular, we focus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838645
decision making in an interpersonal context. The influence of social comparison on risky choices is explored in an experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513239
This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136955
dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137046
An experiment is conducted were subjects interact repeatedly to examine the effect of a particular leniency program on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137065
-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100
We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a first price auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with a positive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions and bidding behavior in a second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137109
This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144451
Recent theoretical work shows that folk theorems can be developed for infinite overlapping generations games. Cooperation in such games can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. Besides the efficient cooperative equilibrium there is also the inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144485