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Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations

Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838534

The Degradation of Distorted Performance Measures

Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam van - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Baker (2002) has demonstrated theoretically that the quality of performance measures used in compensation contracts hinges on two characteristics: noise and distortion. These criteria, though, will only be useful in practice as long as the noise and distortion of a performance measure can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137095

Social Identity Strategies in Recent Economics

Davis, John B. - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper reviews three distinct strategies in recent economics for using the concept of social identity in the … social identity and personal identity together. The argument of the paper is that too narrow a scope for reflexivity in … and social identity together in connection with an individual behavior termed comparative value-objective evaluation. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137365

Exploitation and Cooperation in Networks

Galeotti, Andrea; Meléndez, Miguel - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A fundamental question in social sciences is how trust emerges. We provide an answer which relies on the formation of social and economic relationships. We argue that behind trust lies the fact that individuals invest in connections taking into account the potential externalities networks...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144533

The Price of a Price: On the Crowding out of Social Norms

Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Mendys, Ewa - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

There is increasing empirical and experimental evidence that providing financial incentives to agents to perform certain socially desirable actions may permanently reduce other types of motivations to undertake these actions. We study the impact of financial incentives on the desire for social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136944

The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power to take Game: An Experimental Study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

The power to take game is a simple two player game where players are randomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder. Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual real effort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137100

The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137115

Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144442

The Desire for Impact

Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make a firm in a competitive labor market face an upward-sloping supply curve of labor, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137029

Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies

Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137194