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Dijk, Frans van; Sonnemans, Joep; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 1996

The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137243

Linde, Jona; Sonnemans, Joep - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

decision making in an interpersonal context. The influence of social comparison on risky choices is explored in an experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513239

The Financial Trilemma

Schoenmaker, Dirk - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

The financial trilemma states that financial stability, financial integration and national financial policies are incompatible. Any two of the three objectives can be combined but not all three; one has to give. This paper develops a model to underpin the financial trilemma. Our findings for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838619

Control without Deception

Bardsley, Nicholas - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

in a public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more … sensitive to free-riding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that … explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.<BR><BR> …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136962

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game to a strangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations. Subjects in the partners condition contribute from the first period on significantly more to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136974

The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment

Hopfensitz, Astrid; Reuben, Ernesto - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper experimentally explores how the enforcement of cooperative behavior in a social dilemma is facilitated through institutional as well as emotional mechanisms. Recent studies emphasize the importance of negatively valued emotions, such as anger, which motivate individuals to punish free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137115

Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game

Neugebauer, Tibor; Poulsen, Anders; Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to test various models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and rational behavior. Our results are inconsistent with leading models in this field.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137274

Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137047

The Design of (De)centralized Punishment Institutions for Sustaining Co-operation

Kosfeld, Michael; Riedl, Arno - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

investigated mechanisms is that both are based on the imposition of sanctions for free-riding behavior. The main difference between …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137197

Hurting hurts more than Helping helps: The Role of the Self-serving Bias

Offerman, Theo - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

This paper investigates an implication of the self-serving bias for reciprocal responses. It is hypothesized that negative intentionality matters more than positive intentionality for reciprocating individuals with a self-serving attributional style. Experimental evidence obtained in the hot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136955